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establishment of an effective national machinery in the form of a central
policy-coordinating bureau would help to bridge the gap between international
standards and domestic reality.
Until that time, however, the impact of the CEDAW Convention in Hong
Kong will come from a bottom-up trajectory. Principles of equality begin with
individual behaviour. As societies progress and develop, people change.
Deeply-held traditional assumptions about the roles of men and women and the
organization of society change, even as methods of production and
communication change.
No single United Nations convention or international process can create a
fair, just society. To have a vision of that which is just, however, does create
momentum towards the achievement of that goal. The CEDAW process does
just that. It helps to create an environment in which governments must
account for their treatment of its citizenry, and it raises an awareness of what
it means to incorporate democratic norms and policies into practical
governmental programmes. That dynamic can be a powerful one, and it
provides opportunities for and encouragement to the many people throughout
the world who continue to believe in equality and work towards the realization
of a society free of discrimination against any of its members.
Moana Erickson* and Andrew Byrnes"
When Government Intervenes:
Winding Up Fraudulent Companies in Hong Kong
Introduction
Most corporate insolvencies in Hong Kong are commenced by a creditor on the
ground that the debtor company is unable to pay its debts. However, each year
a small number of liquidations are commenced by a regulatory authority or a
government official - namely, the Registrar of Companies, the Financial
Secretary, the Securities and Futures Commission (the 'SFC'), or the Insurance
Authority - against companies that are allegedly engaged in illegal or
fraudulent activities. These filings are made on 'public interest', unfair prejudice,
or other statutory grounds, irrespective of whether insolvency can be proved.
Allowing regulatory authorities or government officials to intervene against
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companies through the filing of winding-up petitions is an important statutory
remedy that is intended to deter companies from engaging in wrongful or
fraudulent behaviour.1
The existing statutory framework for the commencement of liquidations by
regulatory authorities and government officials is quite complicated because
the relevant statutory provisions are not consolidated in a single ordinance.
Rather, the commencement procedures are located in the Companies
Ordinance,2 the Securities and Futures Commission Ordinance,3 the Leveraged
Foreign Exchange Trading Ordinance, 4 the Banking Ordinance, and the
Insurance Companies Ordinance.6 Once a case is commenced, the liquidation
is carried out pursuant to the winding-up procedures in the Companies
Ordinance and the Companies (Winding-up) Rules, subject to any exceptions
contained in the relevant legislation. This article provides an overview and
analysis of this statutory structure and suggests how it could be improved.
For purposes of comparison, the first part of this article briefly sets out the
procedures in the Companies Ordinance for the winding up of companies by
the court. The second part discusses the commencement procedures used by
government officials and regulatory authorities to file winding-up petitions
against fraudulent companies. This section also highlights recent cases, sets out
additional or alternative remedies that may be used against companies engaging
in fraudulent activity, and considers relevant law reform proposals. The third
part then discusses the appointment ofand the role to be played by, provisional
liquidators in such cases.
The general procedures in the Companies Ordinance for the winding up of
companies by the court
Hong Kong companies (primarily companies 'formed and registered' under Part
I of the Companies Ordinance and which the Ordinance calls 'registered'
companies) are wound up under Part V of the Companies Ordinance.
'Unregistered' companies (which include foreign companies and oversea
companies registered under Part XI of the Companies Ordinance) are wound
up under Part X of the Companies Ordinance.7
See Report of the Review Committee on Insolvency Law and Practice in the United Kingdom, Cmnd 8558
(London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, June 1982), under the Chairmanship of Sir Kenneth Cork,
GBE, paras 1745-5 1, pp 392-3 (the Cork Report).
2 Cap 32.
Cap 24.
4 Cap 451.
5 Cap 155.
6 Cap 41.
For a discussion of the winding up of unregistered companies in Hong Kong, see Charles D Booth,
'Living in Uncertain Times: The Need to Strengthen Hong Kong Transnational Insolvency Law'
(1996) 34 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 389 ('Living in Uncertain Times'); and Charles
D Booth, 'The Transnational Aspects of Hong Kong Insolvency Law' (1995) 2 Southwestern Journal
of Law and Trade in the Americas I.
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Section 177(1) of the Companies Ordinance provides that a Hong Kong
company may be wound up by the court' if -
(a) the company has by special resolution resolved that the company be
wound up by the court;
(b) the company does not commence its business within a year from its
incorporation, or suspends its business for a whole year;
(c) the number of its members is reduced below 2;
(d) the company is unable to pay its debts;
(e) the event, if any, occurs on the occurrence of which the memorandum
or articles provide that the company is to be dissolved;
(f) the court is of opinion that it is just and equitable that the company
should be wound up.
Section 179(1) of the Companies Ordinance provides that a winding-up
petition may be presented by a variety of parties, including the company itself,
any creditor or creditors (including any contingent or prospective creditor or
creditors), or contributory or contributories (or the trustee in bankruptcy or the
personal representative of a contributory). 9 However, the typical petitioner is
an unsecured creditor relying on s 177(1)(d) of the Companies Ordinance and
the inability of a company to satisfy a s 178 statutory demand. Section 178 of
the Companies Ordinance defines the inability of a company to pay its debts
to a creditor and includes both a cash flow and a balance sheet test. Section 178
(1) (a) provides that a company shall be deemed to be unable to pay its debts,
inter alia, if it fails to comply within three weeks with a statutory demand for
a sum exceeding HK$5,000.
A petitioner listed in s 179 may rely on the just and equitable ground in s 177
(1)(f) as a ground for petitioning, inter alia, for the winding up of a company
that is engaging in fraudulent or illegal activities. For example, courts have
ordered a company to be wound up on this ground: (1) where a company was
A Hong Kong company may also he wound up through a voluntary winding up (a winding up without
a court order). See Companies Ordinance, ss 228-257. A voluntary winding up of a solvent company
proceeds as a members' voluntary winding up (see ibid, ss 234-239A) and of an insolvent company,
as a creditors' voluntary winding up (see ibid, ss 240-248). Whether a voluntary winding up proceeds
as a members' voluntary winding up or as a creditors' voluntary winding up depends on whether the
directors are able to make a statutory declaration that the company will be able to pay its debts in full
within twelve months of the commencement of the winding up. See ibid, s 233.
Most voluntary windings up proceed as members' voluntary windings up, and thus involve the
liquidation of solvent companies. For example, in 1998, 3,005 members' voluntary windings up and
211 creditors' voluntary windings up were commenced and in 1999, 3,067 members' voluntary
windings up and 322 creditors' voluntary windings up. Companies Registry website at http://www.
info.gov.hk/cr/key/index.htm. However, the great majority of liquidations of insolvent companies
proceed as compulsory liquidations. For example, in 1998,946 compulsory winding-up petitions were
presented and 723 windin-up orders were made, and in the first eleven months of 1999, 1057
winding up petitions were presented and 695 winding-up orders were made. Official Receiver's Office
website at http://www.info.gov.hk/oro/statis.htm.
9eSection 179(1)(a) of the Companies Ordinance sets out futther conditions for a petition filed by a
contributory and s 179(1)(c), for apetition by a contingent or prospective creditor. Section 179(2)
also enables the Official Receiver to file a petition where a company is being wound up voluntarily.
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formed to carry out fraud or an illegal purpose;' ° or (2) where management's
conduct called for an investigation, including where the facts of suspicious
conduct had been concealed from the shareholders or where persons guilty of
fraud had controlled a company."
The ability of regulatory authorities and government officials to commence
liquidation proceedings against companies engaged in illegal or fraudulent
activities irrespective of whether insolvency can be proved
The Companies Ordinance empowers the Registrar of Companies and the
Financial Secretary to petition for the winding up of companies under defined
circumstances irrespective of whether insolvency can be proved. Similar
powers are given to the Financial Secretary and regulatory authorities by the
Securities and Futures Commission Ordinance, the Leveraged Foreign Exchange
Trading Ordinance, the Banking Ordinance, and the Insurance Companies
Ordinance. Of the hundreds of compulsory liquidations per year, normally only
a handful are commenced by government officials and regulatory authorities.
Ability of the Regstrar of Companies to petition for the winding up of companies under
the Companies Ordinance
Section 179(1)(e) of the Companies Ordinance provides that the Registrar of
Companies may present a winding-up petition on any of the six grounds set out
in s 177(1)(c) and (2) of the Companies Ordinance. Four of these grounds
involve a company's non-compliance with certain basic company law
obligations, 2 rather than its engaging in illegal or fraudulent activities, and
therefore fall outside the scope of this article. However, the two other grounds
are relevant to the winding up of fraudulent companies. Section 177(2)
provides that on an application by the Registrar to wind up a company, the
company may be wound up by the court if it appears to the court as follows:
(a) that the company is being carried on for an unlawful purpose or any
purpose lawful in itself but one which cannot be carried out by a
company; or
10 See Roman Tomasic & ELG Tyler, Hong Kong Company Law: Legislation and Commentary (Hong
Kong: Butterworths, 1998-), para [92031, p 2,852 (citing Re TE Brinsmead & Sons Ltd [1897] 1 Ch 406
(setting up by former employees of a rival business with a similar name with the intention to pass off
the new business as the old); Re Internaional Securities Corp Ltd (1908) 25 TLR 31; R v Registrar of
Companies, Ex parte Attorney General [1991] BCLC 476).1' Ibid, p 2 ,8 5 6 (citing Re Yue Hing Co Ltd (1915) 10 HKLR 32, on appeal (1916) 11 HKLR 53, 82).
12 For example, a company doing any of the following: reducing the number of its members below two
(Companies Ordinance, s 177(1)(c); throughout a period of at least six months leading up to the date
of a winding-up petition, not having at least two directors, or a secretary (ibid, s 177(2)(b) & (c));
or failing to pay its annual company registration fee (ibid, s 177(2)(d)).
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(e) without prejudice to paragraphs (a) to (d) [of s 177(2)], that the
company has been persistently in breach of its obligations under this
Ordinance.
Ability of the Financial Secretary to petition for the winding up of companies under
the Companies Ordinance
Section 179(1)(d) of the Companies Ordinance provides that the Financial
Secretary may present a winding-up petition in a case falling within
s 147( 2)(a) of the Companies Ordinance. Section 147(2) sets out when the
Financial Secretary may petition for relief and provides as follows :
If, in the case of any body corporate liable to be wound up under this
Ordinance, it appears to the Financial Secretary from a report made [by an
inspector appointed to investigate the affairs of a company] under section
146 [of the Companies Ordinance] or from any information or document
obtained under Section 152A 3 or 152B 14 [of the Companies Ordinance]-
(a) that it is expedient in the public interest that the body should be
wound up, he may present a petition for it to be wound up if the court
thinks it just and equitable for it to be so wound up;
(b) that the business of such body corporate is being or has been conducted
in a manner unfairly prejudicial to the interests of the members
generally or of any part of its members, he may (in addition to, or
instead of, presenting a petition under paragraph (a)) present
a petition for an order under section 168A [of the Companies
Ordinance].5
Pursuant to ss 142 and 143 of the Companies Ordinance, the Financial
Secretary may appoint an inspector to investigate the affairs of a company and
to report thereon. Section 143 (1)(c) provides that the Financial Secretary may
appoint an inspector (or inspectors) 6 if it appears to the Financial Secretary
that there are circumstances suggesting-
(i) that the business of the company has been or is being conducted with
intent to defraud its creditors or the creditors of any other person or
otherwise for a fraudulent or unlawful purpose or in a manner oppressive
of any part of its members or that it was formed for any fraudulent or
unlawful purpose; or
13 Pursuant to the power of the Financial Secretary to require the production of documents.
14 Pursuant to a warrant issued by a magistrate.
15 Section 168A is an alternative remedy to windingup that may be used in cases in which it is alleged
that the affairs of the company are being or have been conducted in a manner unfairly prejudicial to
the interests of the members generally or to some part of the members. For further discussion of this
issue, see Tomasic & Tyler (note 10 above), paras [8252-8501], pp 2,407-2,605.16 Section 143(2) provides that this power shall be exercisable by the Financial Secretary with respect
to a company regardless of whether the company is in the course of being voluntarily wound up.
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(ii) that persons concerned with the formation or the management of its
affairs have in connexion therewith been guilty of fraud, misfeasance
or other misconduct towards it or towards its members; or
(iii) that its members have not been given all the information with respect
to its affairs that they might reasonably expect.'7
An additional advantage of appointing an inspector is that an inspector may
examine witnesses who are involved in the case. i" Inspectors were appointed
to investigate the affairs of the Allied Group and the World Trade Centre
Group in the early 1990s. Recently, an inspector was also appointed to
investigate the collapse of Peregrine Investments Holdings Ltd and Peregrine
Fixed Income Ltd. Since the companies were already in the process of being
compulsorily wound up, the inspector was appointed by the Financial Secretary
pursuant to a court order.19
To summarize, the Financial Secretary may only petition under s 179(1)(d)
of the Companies Ordinance in cases where it appears to the Financial
Secretary (i) from an inspector's report under s 146 or (ii) from any information
or document obtained under s 152A or 152B, that it is 'expedient in the public
interest' for the company to be wound up. It will then be a matter for the court
to determine whether it is just and equitable for the company to be wound up.
An example of a case in which companies were wound up on the petition of the
Financial Secretary filed after an investigation was conducted is First Bangkok
City Finance Ltd & Anor v Coro Tejapaibui & Ors.2" The Financial Secretary had
asserted that seven Thai nationals ran two deposit-taking companies for their
own benefit and diverted the companies' funds into other companies that they
wholly or partly owned or into accounts that were in the name of their families
or associates.
Ability of the Securities and Futures Commission to petition for the winding up of listed
companies under the Securities and Futures Commission Ordinance and of licensed
leveraged foreign exchange traders under the Leveraged Foreign Exchange Trading
Ordinance
17 Section 143(1) also provides for the appointment of an inspector (or inspectors) by the Financial
Secretary pursuant to a court order (sub-s (a)) or to a corporate special resolution (sub-s (b)). Unlike
an appointment pursuant to sub-s (b) or (c), where a court order is made under sub-s (a), the
appointment is mandatory.
8 More particularly, a person who 'is or may be in possession of any information concerning [the
company's] affairs'. Companies Ordinance, s 145(1A). See also ibid, s 145(2A).
:9 See Financial Secretary v Peregrine Investmrnts Holdings Ltd (in liq) & Ors [1999] 2 HKLRD 691 (22
April 1999) (granting a declaration under s 143(1)(a) that the affairs of Peregrine Investments
Holdings Ltd and Peregrine Fixed Income Ltd ought to be investigated by an inspector or inspectors
appointed by the Financial Secretary). The SFC had also investigated the collapse of Peregrine and
referred the matter to the government after determining that it had 'insufficient power to conduct
the investigation'. See Enoch Yiu, 'Independent Peregrine crash probe considered', South China
Morning Post (Business Post), 24 June 1998, p 1. Unlike an inspector, the SFC was not able to
examine witnesses. See text accompanying notes 47-48 below.20 [198911 HKC453.
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The Securities and Futures Commission Ordinance empowers the SFC to
regulate the dealing in securities and trading in futures contracts of listed
companies. Section 45 (1) of the Securities and Futures Commission Ordinance
provides that in the case of a listed company that may be wound up by the Court
of First Instance under the Companies Ordinance, where it appears to the SFC
'that it is expedient in the public interest that the company should be wound
up', the SFC may (subject to sub-s (2)) present a petition for the company to
be wound up under the Companies Ordinance on the ground that it is 'just and
equitable' that the company should be so wound up. Section 59 of the
Leveraged Foreign Exchange Trading Ordinance provides similarly in the case
of a leveraged foreign exchange trader, requiring that it must appear to the SFC
that 'it is expedient in the interest of the investing or general public' that the
limited company should be wound up.
Once a petition is presented by the SFC under s 45 (1) or 59 of the respective
ordinance, the court has the power to wind up the company,21 regardless of
whether the company is insolvent.22 This statutory approach of ss 45 and 59
is analogous to the approach noted above under s 179 of the Companies
Ordinance in cases commenced on a public interest petition by the Financial
Secretary - first, the SFC must determine whether it is expedient in the public
interest (or, more particularly, in the interest of the investing or general public
under s 59) for the company to be wound up, and then the court must decide
whether it is just and equitable for the company to be so wound up. However,
there are some important differences from the s 179 procedure. Unlike s 179,
ss 45 and 59 do not require that an investigation of the company has occurred
or that the SFC must rely on information or documents obtained in accordance
with statutory procedures. Also, pursuant to s 45(2), the SFC may not petition
under sub-s (1) for the winding up of any 'person' that is a member of a Stock
or Futures Exchange Company or a clearing house, without first providing
written notification to the Company or the clearing house, as the case may
be.23 There is no such notification requirement for any company under s 179.
21 Securities and Futures Commission v Mandarin Resources Corp Ltd & Anor, Companies Winding-Up
No 348 of 1996 (Court of First Instance, 19 November 1999), at 6 (Mandarin Resources IV), http:J
/www.smlawpub.com.hk/Alerts/cases/1999/Nov/Q348C96.ht.
22 See Securities and Futures Commission v Mandarin Resources Corp Ltd & Anor [199711 HKC 214, 225
G (Mandarin Resources I) (noting that 'it would be remarkable if solvent companies were immune
from public interest petitions. That is not what the Ordinance indicates.').
23 There is no equivalent in s 59 of the Leveraged Foreign Exchange Trading Ordinance. Section 46 of
the Securities and Futures Commission Ordinance provides that the SFC may file a 'public interest'
petition against a 'registered person' under the Bankruptcy Ordinance (cap 6) if grounds exist for a
creditor to present such a petition. Section 2 of the Securities and Futures Commission Ordinance
defines a registered person as a person who is registered under the Securities Ordinance (cap 33) or
the Commodities Trading Ordinance (cap 250) (or both) as 'a dealer, dealing partnership, dealer's
representative, investment adviser, commodity trading adviser, investment advisers' partnership,
investment representative or a commodity trading adviser's representative'. Similarly, s 60 of the
Leveraged Foreign Exchange Trading Ordinance provides that the SFC may petition under the
Bankruptcy Ordinance against a 'licensed representative' of a licensed leveraged foreign exchange
trader where it appears to the SFC'that it is expedient in the interest of the investing or general public
to do so'.
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The court must make an independent determination that the company
should be wound up. In a recent interpretation of s 45, the Court of First
Instance stated that in deciding whether to make a winding-up order, a court
must be 'satisfied by the evidence before it and not on the material which the
SFC considered'.24 In reaching this decision, the court noted the need to
balance the 'possibly conflicting interests and wishes of the petitioner and
those of the independent minority and the investing public as a whole'25 and
relied heavily on Re Walter L Jacob & Co Ltd,26 where the court stated:
The Court's task ... is to carry out the balancing exercise described above
having regard to all the circumstances as disclosed by the totality of the
evidence before the court .... Thus where the reasons put forward by the
petitioner are founded on considerations of public interest, the court, if it is
to discharge its obligation to carry out the balancing exercise, must itself
evaluate those reasons to the extent necessary for it to form a view on
whether they do afford sufficient reasons for making a winding up order in
a particular case. 7
The difficulty of determining the meaning of the phrase 'in the public
interest' has been the subject of recent commentary. 8 Given that public
interest petitions may only be filed by government officials or regulatory
authorities, part of whose mandate includes protecting the interest of the public
from wrongful actions committed by entitities subject to their supervision or
regulation, it would seem that inherent in the phrase is some notion of
furthering the public good and of protecting society generally. 9 In a given case,
however, the determination of the matter will depend on the specific facts at
issue. Recent liquidations commenced by the SFC on s 45 petitions have
involved MKI Corp Ltd,3" Mandarin Resources Corp Ltd ('Mandarin
24 Mandarin Resources IV (note 21 above), p 7.
25 Ibid.
26 (1989) 5 BCC 244.
27 Mandarin Resources IV (note 21 above), p 7 (quoting Re Walter L Jacob & Co Ltd (note 26 above),
p 2 5 1).28 See, eg, Andrew Keay, 'Public Interest Petitions' (1999) 20(9) The Company Lawyer 296, 299.
29 See ibid (suggesting that "in the public interest" means something that is in the interest of society
as a whole, as opposed to specific sectors of the community or certain people, such as creditors, who
are interested in the company which is the subject of the petition.')30 See Securities and Futures Commission v MKI Corp Ltd [1995] 2 HKC 79 (MKI I); Re MKI Corp Ltd
[19951 HKLY 180 (25 October 1995) (MK II). MKI, incorporated in Bermuda, had established a
place of business in Hong Kong and was an oversea company that had registered under Part XI of the
Companies Ordinance. The SFC petitioned under s 327 of the Companies Ordinance to wind up
MKI as an unregistered company under Part X of the Companies Ordinance. The High Court held
that an oversea company may be wound up under s 327 irrespective of whether it has registered under
Parr XI of the Ordinance. For further discussion of this case, see Booth, 'Living in Uncertain Times'
(note 7 above), pp 407-14. The holding from this case has since been incorporated into s 326(2) of
the Companies Ordinance through a statutory amendment, the Companies (Amendment) Ordinance
1997 (3 of 1997), s 48(b), commencing 10 February 1997.
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Resources'), 31 Forluxe Securities, the CA Pacific Group, and the Ming Fung
Group. These cases prove instructive:
" MKI Corp Ltd - This was the first listed company that the SFC
petitioned to wind up under s 45. The SFC suspected that the directors
of MKI had misled the public (eg, by releasing misleading information)
and committed fraud (eg, by siphoning money out of the company).32
The High Court later noted that MKI:
had been used to dupe the public. The shares had been artificially
boosted with false information and at the same time money was at
best frittered away in imprudent deals and more likely siphoned out
of the Company with unscrupulous deals and all the time the
Company was giving the impression it was being run by its directors
when in fact they were acting as fronts for a person who had good
reason to distance himself and be seen to distance himself from the
company.33
" Mandarin Resources - The SFC petitioned under both s 45 and s 37A 34
of the Securities and Futures Commission Ordinance seeking a number
of remedies including redress for the minority shareholders of Mandarin
Resources and/or the winding up of the company, based on a complicated
series of transactions perpetrated by Chim Pui-chung (the majority
shareholder of Mandarin Resources through nominees or companies
controlled by Chim) to extract for his personal benefit the major asset of
Mandarin Resources, as well as on Chim's alleged violation of takeover
and listing rules and company and security laws.3"
" Forluxe Securities - The brokerage ceased operating after its director
and 99% shareholder disappeared. The police classified the case as one
involving conspiracy to defraud and the SFC intervened 'for the protection
and preservation of the assets of Forluxe, and to facilitate the orderly
return of assets to clients.'36
" CA Pacific Group - The SFC filed petitions against members of the
group after it became apparent that client assets 'may not have been
adequately protected.'37 Clients alleged that without their knowledge,
31 See Mandarin Resources I (note 22 above); Securities and Futures Commission v Mandarin Resources
Corp Ltd & Anor [1997] 2 HKC 166 (Mandarin Resources II); Securities and Futures Commission v
Mandarin Resources Corp Ltd & Anor [1997] HKLY 192 (26 June 1997) (Mandarin Resources II1);
Mandarin Resources IV (note 21 above).31 MKI II (note 30 above).
" Ibid.
34 Discussed below in text accompanying notes 40-45.35 See Mandarin Resources I (note 22 above).
36 'Forluxe Securities Will Be Liquidated', Asian Wall Street Journal, 8 May 1998, p 5 (quoting the
SFC),31 Securities and Futures Commission, Annual Report 97198 (Hong Kong: Securities and Futures
Commission, 1998), paras 2.61-.62, pp 29-30 & para 6.17, p 59.
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their shares, which had been held in cash accounts at CA Pacific
Securities, had been transferred to margin accounts at CA Pacific
Finance where they were used as collateral and later sold by banks when
CA Pacific Finance had been unable to pay its debts.3"
Ming Fung Group - It was alleged that after the managing director of
Ming Fung suffered large personal losses in futures trading, he used client
funds to cover his losses. It was also alleged that many clients' securities
were missing.39
As can be seen from discussion of Mandarin Resources above, the SFC may
also petition against a listed company under s 3 7A of the Securities and Futures
Commission Ordinance. Section 37A provides the SFC with an alternative
remedy in cases where 'the affairs of a listed company are being or have been
conducted in a manner unfairly prejudicial to the interests of its members
generally or of some part of the members'. Thus, unlike the s 45 public interest
ground, which focuses on the interest of the public and society generally, s 37A
is concerned with the treatment of actual members of the company. Pursuant
to s 37A(1), the SFC, after consultation with the Financial Secretary, may
make an application to the Court of First Instance by petition for an order under
the section. 0 Sub-section (2) provides as follows:
If on a petition under this section the court is of the opinion that the
company's affairs are being or have been conducted in a manner unfairly
prejudicial to the interests of its members generally or of some part of the
members, whether or not the conduct consists of an isolated act or a series
of acts, the court may, with a view to bringing to an end the matters
complained of -
(a) make an order restraining the commission of the act or conduct;
(b) order that such proceedings as it may think fit shall be brought in the
name of the company against the persons, and on the terms, that it
orders;
(c) appoint a receiver or manager of the whole or a part of the company's
property or business and may specify the powers and duties of the
receiver or manager and fix his remuneration;
38 Lana Wong, 'Fraud inquiry loom for CAP Group units', South China Morning Post (Business Post),
22 January 1998, p 3.39 Enoch Yiu, 'Exchange in tough stance on scandals', South China Morning Post (Business Post),
27 May 1998, p 3.
40 Unlike s 45, s 37A requires that for the SFC to file a petition, the supporting information, record or
other document must have been obtained under s 29A of the Securities and Futures Commission
Ordinance (which gives the SFC the power of investigation), or under s 36 in relation to s 29A
(pursuant to a magistrate's warrant). These requirements are similar to the requirements for the
Financial Secretary under the Companies Ordinance when filing a public interest petition. See text
accompanying notes 13,14 above.
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(d) make any other order it thinks fit, whether for regulating the conduct
of the company's affairs in future, or for the purchase of the shares of
any members of the company by other members of the company or by
the company and, in the case of a purchase by the company, for the
reduction accordingly of the company's capital, or otherwise. 41
In earlier litigation involving Mandarin Resources, the Court of Appeal found
that s 37A includes a power to wind up a listed company.42
The Court of First Instance has noted that in interpreting s 37A(2), before
deciding what relief, in any, should be granted, the court must be satisfied that
the following four ingredients have been proved: (1) that the affairs of the
company have been or are being conducted in a manner ...; (2) that the
conduct is prejudicial to the company's members or part of them; (3) that the
prejudice is unfair prejudice; and (4) that the unfair prejudicial conduct affects
the members' interests. 43
In a given case, the SFC may petition under both s 45 and s 37A, as it did
in regard to Mandarin Resources. Only recently, the Court of First Instance
ruled on the s 37A issues involved in that case and held that the affairs of
Mandarin Resources in fact 'are being and have been conducted in a manner
unfairly prejudicial to the interests of the minority shareholders' and ordered
Mr Chim (whom it found was in control of the company and, although not a
registered shareholder, was the beneficial owner of the majority of the
company's shares) to purchase the shares of the independent minority
shareholders at a fair value.44 It also directed that Mr Chim be declared unfit
to hold a management position in Mandarin Resources and be disqualified
from acting as a director.4"
The Securities and Futures Commission Ordinance provides the SFC with
a variety of other powers to investigate fraudulent or unlawful activity by a
listed company or its directors, which might well lead to the discovery of
information upon which a s 45 or 37A petition could be based. For example,
in certain defined situations, s 29A(1) empowers the SFC to require the
production of specified records and documents from a company, its subsidiaries,
or any company substantially under the control of the same person as the
company. Additional powers exercisable by the SFC under s 29A include the
following: requesting records and documents from any person who appears to
be in possession of them (sub-s (3)); and requiring a person (including a present
41 As noted by the court in Mandarin Resources IV (note 21 above), p 4, these provisions are almost
identical to the provisions appearing in s 168 of the Companies Ordinance, with the only difference
being that under s 37A the petition must be filed by the SFC.
41 Mandarin Resources III (note 31 above).
43 Mandarin Resources IV (note 21 above), p 4.
44 lbid,p 61. See also Mandarin Resources I (note 22 above).
45 Mandarin Resources IV (note 21 above), p 61. See also Mandarin Resources I (note 22 above), p 223.
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or past officer) to provide an explanation of them (sub-s (4)(a)(ii)) and to verify
the explanation by statutory declaration (sub-s (8)). Pursuant to sub-s 10, in a
case involving an authorized institution as defined under the Banking Ordinance,
the SFC's power to give directions regarding the production of rec6rds and
documents may only be exercised in respect of the circumstances specified in
sub-s (1)(c) or (1)(d) (with some further limitations).
Section 30 provides the SFC with power to ascertain whether a 'registered
person' 46 under the Ordinance has complied with any provision of, or any
requirement under, the relevant Ordinance or the terms and conditions of any
certificate of registration. This is accomplished by granting the SFC in certain
defined circumstances the right to enter the premises of the registered person
and to inspect and make copies of any record or document. Section 31
empowers the SFC to require from certain persons information relating to
transactions involving securities or futures contracts. Section 32, in turn
provides that if a person, without reasonable excuse, fails to comply with s 29A,
30, or 31, the SFC may certify the failure to the Court of First Instance and the
Court of First Instance may ultimately hold the person in contempt of court.
Section 33(1) provides detailed guidelines as to the ability of the SFC to
investigate alleged offences including (under sub-s (b)) the commission of a
'defalcation or other breach of trust, fraud, or misfeasance' -
(i) in dealing in securities or trading in future contracts;
(ii) in the management of investment in securities or in futures contracts;
(iii) in making property investment arrangements; or
(iv) in giving advice as regards the acquisition, disposal, purchase or sale,
or otherwise investing in, any security or futures contract or as regards
any property investment arrangements.
Section 36 provides that the SFC may seek a magistrate's warrant to assist
with the compliance of s 29A, 30, or 33 of the Ordinance. Sections 39, 40, and
41 provide the SFC (in defined circumstances) with powers regarding the
restriction of business, the restriction on dealing with assets, and the maintenance
of assets.
One weakness of the SFC's investigatory powers is the inability of the SFC
to question certain third parties, which was evident in the SFC's investigation
into the collapse of Peregrine Investments Holdings.47 This matter is likely to
be addressed in the proposed Composite Securities and Futures Bill.48
46 See note 23 above. See also ss 41-55 of the Leveraged Foreign Exchange Trading Ordinance with
respect to powers of investigation and intervention against a licensed leveraged foreign exchange
trader.
47 See note 19 above.48 See text accompanying notes 77-82 below.
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The ability of the Financial Secretary to petition for the winding up of 'authorized
institutions' under the Banking Ordinance
The Banking Ordinance establishes a three-tier structure for regulating
authorized deposit-taking institutions, which are called 'authorized institutions'.
Section 2 of the Banking Ordinance sets out the following three tiers of
authorized institutions: (1) banks (licensed banks); (2) restricted licence
banks; and (3) deposit-taking companies.
Authorized institutions may operate in Hong Kong as companies
incorporated in Hong Kong or as branches of foreign banks. Licensed banks
have the greatest amount of flexibility in their operations, for they may
establish current accounts and accept any deposit (regardless of its size or
maturity). Restricted licence banks may only take deposits (of any maturity)
greater than or equal to HK$500,000 and are primarily engaged in activities
related to merchant banking and capital markets. Deposit-taking companies
may only take deposits greater than or equal to HK$100,000 (with an original
term to maturity of at least three months) and often engage in consumer
finance and securities activities.49 The authorisation criteria for authorized
institutions 'seek to ensure that only fit and proper institutions are entrusted
with public deposits'."0
The Hong Kong Monetary Authority (the 'HKMA') is the government
authority responsible for maintaining monetary and banking stability in Hong
Kong and for supervising and monitoring authorized institutions. Authorized
institutions must comply with a variety of obligations, including, for example,
maintaining capital adequacy and liquidity ratios,5" submitting periodic returns
to the HKMA,52 and complying with the limitations on loans by and interests
of authorized institutions."
Part X of the Banking Ordinance sets out various powers of control that may
be exercised over authorized institutions. Section 52 provides that the HKMA,
after consultation with the Financial Secretary, may exercise certain powers
under the following conditions:
(1) Where-
(a) an authorized institution informs the Monetary Authority-
(i) that it is likely to become unable to meet its obligations; or
(ii) that it is insolvent or about to suspend payment;
(b) an authorized institution becomes unable to meet its obligations
or suspends payment;
(c) the Monetary Authority is of the opinion that -
49 Financial Services website at http://www.info.gov.hk/fsb/fs/content.htm.
10 Ibid.
51 See Banking Ordinance, Parts XVII & XVIII.52 Ibid, Part XII.
53 Ibid, Part XV.
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(i) an authorized institution is carrying on its business in a
manner detrimental to the interests of -
(A) its depositors or potential depositors;
(B) its creditors; or
(C) holders or potential holders of multi-purpose cards [a
type of stored-value card] issued by it or the issue of
which is facilitated by it ;
(ii) an authorized institution is insolvent or is likely to become
unable to meet its obligations or is about to suspend payment;
(iii) an authorized institution has contravened or failed to comply
with any of the provisions of the Banking Ordinance;...
(d) the Financial Secretary advises the Monetary Authority that he
considers it in the public interest to do so[.]
These powers include the power to impose restrictions on an authorized
institution in relation to its affairs, business, and property;54 to direct that the
institution seek advice from an Advisor appointed by the HKMA;" to appoint
a Manager to take control of the affairs, business, and property of an authorized
institution;56 or to report the circumstances to the Chief Executive in
Council. 7 However, the HKMA shall not exercise the powers under s 52(1)
(B) or (C) of the Banking Ordinance in respect of an institution that has been
ordered wound up by the Court of First Instance.5" In 1998, the HKMA
exercised its formal powers under s 52 on two occasions.
59
Section 55 of the Banking Ordinance provides the HKMA with the power
to examine the books, accounts, and transactions of any authorized institution,
and s 56 requires the authorized institution to produce its books and accounts
during a s 55 examination or investigation. Section 59 authorises the HKMA
to require an authorized institution to submit an auditor's report, and the
HKMA exercised this power nine times in 1998.60
Section 53 (1)(iii) of the Banking Ordinance gives the Chief Executive in
Council the power 'to direct the Financial Secretary to present a petition to the
Court of First Instance for the winding up of the authorized institution or former
authorized institution by the Court of First Instance.' This power may be
exercised in cases where (a) the HKMA makes a report to the Chief Executive
in Council under s 52(1)(D) of the Banking Ordinance; (b) any person appeals
14 Ibid, s 52(1)(A).
55 Ibids 52(1)(B).
56 Ibid, s 52(1)(C). In respect of an authorized institution incorporated outside Hong Kong, this power
may only be exercised in relation to the affairs, business or property of the institution that has a Hong
Kong connection. See ibid, s 51(3D).
57 Ibid, s 52(I)(D).
58 Ibid, s 52(3E).
59 Hong Kong Monetary Authority, Annual Report 1998 (Hong Kong: Hong Kong Monetary Authority,
1998), p 44.60 Ibid.
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to the Chief Executive in Council under s 132A(1) of the Ordinance against
a decision of the HKMA under certain sub-sections in s 52 of the Ordinance;
or (c) the Financial Secretary refers a report and his recommendations thereon
to the Chief Executive in Council under s 117 (5)(c) of the Ordinance.
The Financial Secretary may also petition for the winding up of an
authorized institution or a former authorized institution under ss 117(5) (0 and
122(5) of the Banking Ordinance. Section 117(5)(f) provides that the Financial
Secretary may petition under s 122(5) of the Banking Ordinance upon receipt
of a report prepared by an individual under s 117 (2) of the Banking Ordinance.
A s 117(2) report is prepared by an individual who has been appointed by the
HKMA to conduct an enquiry into the affairs, business, or property of an
authorized institution. The HKMA makes such an appointment where it
believes that it is in the interest of depositors of such institution or in the public
interest to do so.
In windings up commenced pursuant to s 53(1)(iii) or 117(5)(f) of the
Banking Ordinance, s 122 of the Ordinance plays an important role. Section
122(1) provides that the creditors' voluntary winding-up provisions in the
Companies Ordinance shall not apply to authorized institutions. Section 122
(2) provides as follows:
On a petition by the Financial Secretary, acting in accordance with a
direction of the Chief Executive in Council under section 53(1)(iii), the
Court of First Instance may -
(a) on any ground specified in section 177 of the Companies Ordinance
(Cap. 32); or
(b) if it is satisfied that it is in the public interest that the authorized
institution or former authorized institution should be wound up,
order the winding-up of an authorized institution or a former authorized
institution in accordance with the provisions of the Companies Ordinance
(Cap. 32) relating to the winding-up of companies.
This section is broader than s 45 of the Securities and Futures Commission
Ordinance, s 59 of the Leveraged Foreign Exchange Trading Ordinance, and
s 179 of the Companies Ordinance, which provide for a court to make a
winding-up order on a public interest petition where it is just and equitable to
do so. Rather, s 122 provides that the court may either order the winding up
where it is in the public interest to do so or may instead rely on any of the general
grounds set out in s 177 of the Companies Ordinance.
In addition, s 122 restricts the effect of some of the winding-up provisions
in the Companies Ordinance. Section 122(3) includes a deeming provision for
cases in which before a petition has been filed for the winding up of an
authorized institution (whether or not the petition was filed by the Financial
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Secretary) a direction for the appointment of a Manager has been given under
s 52(1 )(c) of the Banking Ordinance and has continued in force up to the filing
of the petition. In such cases, for the purposes of a variety of sections in the
Companies Ordinance6" and notwithstanding the general deeming of s 184(2)
of the Companies Ordinance as to when a winding up commences,6 2 the
winding up by the Court of First Instance shall be deemed to have commenced
at the time the direction was so given. This result would not be self-evident in
a case commenced by an ordinary creditor under s 177 of the Companies
Ordinance against a company that is an authorized institution (or a former
authorized institution) and demonstrates the need for the Companies Ordinance
to cross-reference the winding-up provisions in the Banking Ordinance.
Section 122(4) provides that s 182 of the Companies Ordinance (regarding
the invalidation of any disposition of the property of a company) shall not apply
as against a Manager who has assumed control of an authorized institution, or
as against an institution under the direction of the Manager, acting in good
faith in the course of managing the affairs, business, and property of the
institution.
Section 122(5) provides that where the Financial Secretary is entitled to
petition the Court of First Instance by virtue of s 117 (5)(0, the Court of First
Instance may wind up a deposit-taking company, restricted licence bank,
former deposit-taking company, or former restricted licence bank, in accordance
with the provisions of the Companies Ordinance, if-
(a) the institution is unable to pay sums due and payable to its depositors
or is able to pay such sums only by defaulting on its obligations; or
(b) the value of the institution's assets is less than the amount of its
liabilities.
Perhaps the most well-known insolvency of a financial institution was the
liquidation of the Bank of Credit and Commerce Hong Kong Ltd. On 8 July
1991, the Commissioner of Banking decided to close the bank, and on that
same day the Governor in Council directed the Financial Secretary to present
a petition to wind up the bank. Nine days later a winding-up petition was filed
under s 53(1)(iii) of the Banking Ordinance and the winding up was conducted
under the provisions of the Companies Ordinance.63
61 Namely, ss 170, 179, 182, 183,266, 267, 269, 274, and 271(1)(d), (e), (h), (i), (j), (k), (1), and (o).
62 le, at the time of the filing of the winding-up petition.
63 See Re Bank of Credit and Commerce Hong Kong Ltd, Companies Winding-Up No 218 of 1991.
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The ability of the Insurance Authority to petition for the winding up of insurers under
the Insurance Companies Ordinance
The Office of the Commissioner of Insurance is a government office and is
responsible for administering the Insurance Companies Ordinance, which
governs insurance companies and insurance intermediaries in Hong Kong. The
Commissioner of Insurance is appointed the Insurance Authority64 by the
Chief Executive. Pursuant to s 4A of the Insurance Companies Ordinance, the
principal function of the Insurance Authority is to 'regulate and supervise the
insurance industry for the promotion of the general stability of the insurance
industry and for the protection of existing and potential policy holders.'
An insurer is defined in s 2 of the Insurance Companies Ordinance as a
1person carrying on insurance business but does not include Lloyd's.' Part VI of
the Ordinance, (including ss 42 to 49B) is entitled 'Insolvency and Winding
Up'. Section 44 provides the Insurance Authority with the ability to present a
winding-up petition against an insurer, and s 44(3) provides that the Insurance
Authority may petition if it appears to the Authority that it is 'expedient in the
public interest that the company should be wound up' and if the court thinks
it 'just and equitable' for the insurer to be so wound up. However, a public
interest petition may not be filed where a company is in the process of being
wound up.
The Insurance Companies Ordinance, like the Banking Ordinance, provides
additional grounds for winding up. Section 44(1) (b) and (c) includes grounds
that may be relevant to the winding up of a fraudulent company. This section
provides as follows:
The Insurance Authority may present a petition for the winding up, in
accordance with the Companies Ordinance (Cap. 32), of an insurer, being
a company which may be wound up by the Court under that Ordinance, on
the ground-
(b) that the company has failed to satisfy an obligation to which it is or was
subject by virtue of this Ordinance or any Ordinance repealed thereby;
or
(c) that the company, being under the obligation imposed by section 16
[of the Insurance Companies Ordinance] with respect to the keeping
or preserving of proper books of account, has failed to satisfy that
obligation or to produce books kept in satisfaction of that obligation.
Pursuant to s 44(1) (a), the Insurance Authority may also petition to wind
up an insurer on the ground that the company is unable to pay its debts within
the meaning of ss 177 and 178 or s 327 of the Companies Ordinance.
64 Pursuant to s 4 of the Insurance Companies Ordinance,
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The Insurance Companies Ordinance, like the Banking Ordinance, also
includes provisions that may restrict the effect of the winding-up provisions in
the Companies Ordinance. Section 42(1) of the Insurance Companies
Ordinance includes a provision deeming an insurer for the purposes of s 177 or
327 of the Companies Ordinance to be unable to pay its debts if at any time the
value of the insurer's assets does not exceed the amount of the insurer's
liabilities by the 'relevant amount' as required by s 10 of the Insurance
Companies Ordinance. As to the inability of an insurer to pay its debts, s 44(2)
includes a rebuttable presumption that on a petition presented by the Insurance
Authority under s 44(1), evidence that the company was insolvent at certain
defined times65 shall be evidence that the company continues to be unable to
pay its debts.
Section 44(4) provides that where another person other than the Insurance
Authority petitions for the winding up of an insurance company, a copy of the
winding-up petition shall be served on the Insurance Authority and the
Authority 'shall be entitled to be heard on the petition and to call, examine and
cross-examine any witness and, if he so thinks fit, support or oppose the making
of the winding up order.' However, breach of s 44 does not entitle the Insurance
Authority to a winding-up order as a matter of course; rather, because the
jurisdiction to wind up the company is exercisable under s 177 or 327 of the
Companies Ordinance, the court has an overriding discretion.66
Section 43 provides that the Court of First Instance may order the winding
up of an insurer in accordance with the provisions of the Companies Ordinance,
with the additional proviso that an insurer may be wound up on the petition
of ten or more policy holders with the leave of the court. However, the section
further provides that such a petition shall not be presented except by leave of
the court, and for leave to be granted a prima facie case will have to be
established to the satisfaction of the court and security for costs must be given.
Lastly, s 45 provides, inter alia, that an insurer shall not be wound up voluntarily
unless the court otherwise orders, and that in such cases the Insurance
Authority shall play the same respective role as that set out in s 44(4) in
winding-up cases commenced by another person.67
65 Namely:
" at the close of the period to which the accounts and balance sheet of the company last deposited
under s 20 [of the Insurance Companies Ordinance] relate; or
" at any date or time specified in a requirement under s 32 or 34 [of the Insurance Companies
Ordinance ].
6 See Tomasic & Tyler (note 10 above), para [9251], at 2,857 (citing Re Amour Insurance Co Ltd [1993]
1 HKLR 179).
67 Other relevant provisions in the Insurance Companies Ordinance are as follows: s 46 applies to the
continuation of the long-term business of an insurer in liquidation; s 47, to the winding up of insurers
involved in a transfer of business; s 48, to the reduction of contracts as an alternative to the winding
up of an insurer; s 49, to the making of winding-up rules under s 296 of the Companies Ordinance;
s 49A, to the winding up of an insurer subject to a direction under s 35(2)(b) of the Insurance
Companies Ordinance that a Manager be appointed to manage the affairs business and property of
an insurer; and s 49B, to the requirements of providing notice to the Insurance Authority of the
commencement of a liquidation, of the appointment of a provisional liquidator or liquidator, and of
other matters.
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Law Reform Proposals
The Companies Ordinance does not at present make reference to the ability of
regulatory authorities or the Financial Secretary to petition under other
legislation for the winding up of certain companies. The Law Reform Commission
of Hong Kong Sub-Committee on Insolvency (the 'Sub-Committee on
Insolvency') concluded that although it was not necessary to cross-reference
the provisions that enable regulatory authorities to wind up companies, it
would be useful for the Companies Ordinance to mention these powers.
Therefore, in its Consultation Paper on the Winding-Up Provisions of the Companies
Ordinance, the Sub-Committee proposed that a new s 177(1)(g) be added to the
Companies Ordinance to note that regulatory authorities have powers to wind
up companies.6" In its Report on the Winding-Up Provisions of the Companies
Ordinance,69 the Law Reform Commission of Hong Kong (the 'Law Reform
Commission'), in turn, recommended adoption of this statutory change. The
Law Reform Commission also noted a submission suggesting an alternative -
namely, that a schedule containing all of the bases enabling the regulatory
authorities to wind up a company should be inserted in the proposed Insolvency
Ordinance - and suggested that the matter be left to the Law Draftsman.v"
Neither the Consultation Paper on the Winding-Up Provisions of the Companies
Ordinance nor the Report on the Winding-Up Provisions of the Companies
Ordinance addressed in any detail the issues involving regulatory authorities or
government officials filing winding-up petitions that are based on non-
insolvency grounds. Nor did they discuss the effect of the Banking Ordinance
and the Insurance Companies Ordinance on the application of certain winding-
up provisions in the Companies Ordinance in liquidations of authorized
institutions or insurers. This is because the statutory review by both the Law
Reform Commission and the Sub-Committee on Insolvency focussed, with but
few exceptions, on the provisions of the Companies Ordinance. However, the
issues involving the filing of petitions by regulatory authorities and government
officials, as well as the issues involving the winding up of authorized institutions
and insurers under the Companies Ordinance, require a more detailed
consideration of the interaction among the various pieces of legislation.
Both the Sub-Committee on Insolvency and the Law Reform Commission
are correct in proposing the need to give notice in the winding-up legislation
of the other statutory powers to wind up a company in Hong Kong. However,
I would suggest that it is insufficient merely to add a new section recording that
regulatory authorities have the power to wind up companies. It would be better
68 Law Reform Commission of Hong Kong Sub-Committee on Insolvency, Consultation Paper on the
Winding-Up Provisions of the Companies Ordinance (Hong Kong: Printing Department, April 1998),
para 4.3, p 13.
69 Law Reform Commission of Hong Kong, Report on the Winding-Up Provisions of the Companies
Ordinance (Hong Kong: Printing Department, July 1999), para 9.3, p 35.70 Ibid. See text accompanying note 71 below.
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to add either a schedule or a separate provision setting out all the bases in the
Securities and Futures Commission Ordinance, the Leveraged Foreign Exchange
Trading Ordinance, the Banking Ordinance, and the Insurance Companies
Ordinance that enable the Financial Secretary and regulatory authorities to file
winding-up petitions. This would be a more comprehensive way of addressing
the existing statutory omission.
I would also suggest that other amendments are necessary. As can be seen
from the discussion above of the Banking Ordinance and the Insurance
Companies Ordinance, certain sections limit the effect of the winding-up
provisions in the Companies Ordinance in liquidations involving authorized
institutions and insurers. Some of these provisions, such as s 122 of the Banking
Ordinance and ss 42 to 44 of the Insurance Companies Ordinance, also apply
to liquidations that have not been commenced by the Financial Secretary or
the Insurance Authority. These provisions should be cross-referenced in the
Companies Ordinance. The Law Reform Commission has recommended that
a separate Insolvency Ordinance be established to include all forms of winding
up, receivership, provisional supervision, and bankruptcy.7 Eventually, this
proposed legislation should incorporate all the provisions in the Securities and
Futures Commission Ordinance, the Leveraged Foreign Exchange Trading
Ordinance, the Banking Ordinance, and the Insurance Companies Ordinance
that relate to insolvency.
In its Report on Corporate Rescue and Insolvent Trading, the Law Reform
Commission recommended the enactment of a comprehensive corporate
rescue procedure called provisional supervision, 72 which was recently gazetted
in Part IVB of the Companies (Amendment) Bill 2000. 7' The Law Reform
Commission proposed that provisional supervision should not be imposed on
certain regulated industries including banking, insurance, securities and futures,
and leveraged foreign exchange trading, 74 and this recommendation was
incorporated in the recently gazetted bill into proposed s 168V(1)(b) of the
Companies Ordinance.75 The Law Reform Commission's rationale was that
71 See ibid, ch 2.
72 Law Reform Commission of Hong Kong, Report on Corporate Rescue and Insolvent Trading (Hong
Kong: Government Printer, October 1996).
73 7 January 2000 (LS No 3 to Gazette no 1/2000).
74 Report on Corporate Rescue and insolvent Trading (note 72 above), paras 2.12-.23, pp 22-5. For a
discussion of the Law Reform Commission's recommendations regarding provisional supervision, see
Charles D Booth, 'Hong Kong Corporate Rescue Proposals: Making Secured Creditors More Secure'
(1998) 28 Hong Kong Law Journal 44.75 Pursuant to Companies (Amendment) Bill 2000, s 24. Proposed s 168V(1)(b) provides that subject
to proposed s 168ZD(10), provisional supervision does not apply to these regulated businesses.
Proposed s 168ZD(10) provides that the government in its capacity (if any) as a creditor of a company
is bound by proposed Part IVB of the Companies Ordinance, without prejudice to the operation of
proposed s 168ZD(4), which sets out exemptions from the moratorium in a provisional supervision.
Included in s 168ZD(4) is, inter alia, an exemption for 'any proceedings or other legal process in
relation to the performance of any function or the exercise of any power under s 29A, 30,31,33, 37A
or 45 of the Securities and Futures Commission Ordinance'. Thus, it would appear that the effect of
these proposals is that although the government, in its capacity as a creditor of a company, will be
boundby the moratorium of a company in the midst of provisional supervision, the SFC will
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regulatory bodies in charge of these industries should consider whether to apply
'a remedial procedure through their own legislation.'76 This is a sensible
approach, for such matters are best left to the regulators.
Lastly, the powers of the SFC are in the process of being reviewed and are
likely to be expanded in the proposed Composite Securities and Futures Bill.
At present, nine different ordinances (plus parts of the Companies Ordinance)
govern the securities and futures industry.77 The proposed bill, which is
expected to be tabled by the Legislative Council in mid-2000, will dramatically
overhaul the existing framework. Among the expected changes will be to
further strengthen the SFC's authority and powers in many ways, including the
following:
* to expand the SFC's regulatory authority to include electronic trading
systems; 78
" to widen the SFC's investigatory powers, including giving the SFC
greater breadth in its enquiries with parties that have contractual
relationships with listed companies, 79 and enabling the SFC to more
easily access the banking records of listed companies" and the working
papers of a listed company's auditors;8' and
* to increase sanctions. 82
By expanding the scope of the SFC's investigatory powers, the proposed
Composite Securities and Futures Bill will increase the likelihood that the SFC
will be able to intervene against listed companies with s 45 and 37A petitions
at an earlier stage than is possible at present.
nevertheless be able to file an unfair prejudice or public interest petition against such a company.
However, there is nothing in proposed s 168ZD(10) and (4) that addresses whether a regulated
company may be made subject to provisional supervision. Thus, it is unclear why the exemption of
regulated industries from provisional supervision was made subject to proposed s 168ZD(10).
Proposed s 168V(I)(a) and (2)(a) provides that provisional supervision shall apply to a class of
companies declared in a notice issued in the Gazette by the Secretary for Financial Services to be a
class of companies to which provisional supervision shall apply. But there is nothing in proposed s
168V that makes the exemption of regulated companies in sub-s (1)(b) subject to such a declaration
by the Secretary for Financial Services. Since there is no mechanism in s 168V for resolving such a
dispute, if the Secretary for Financial Services declared, for example, that banks were a class of
companies to which provisional supervision applied, that declaration would be in conflict with
proposed s 168V(1)(b)(i), which exempts banks.
These issues will have to be resolved before the bill is enacted into law.
76 Report on Corporate Rescue and Insolvent Trading (note 72 above), para 2.12, p 22.
7 Securities and Futures Commission, Overview Guide to The Proposed Securities and Futures Bill (5 July
1999), p 4, SFC website at http://www.hksfc.org.hk/eng/index.htm.
78 Ibid, p 13.
79 Ibid, p 18.
so Ibid.
Si Ibid.
82 Ibid, pp 16-17. It will be proposed to amend s 37A of the Securities and Futures Commission
Ordinance to expand the power of the court 'to disquali a person who has engaged in misconduct
from being a director or otherwise taking part in the management of a corporation.' Securities and
Futures Commission, Guide to Legislative Proposals on Powers of Intervention and Proceedings (to be
included in the Securities and Futures Bill) (5 July 1999), p 3, SFC website (note 77 above). No material
changes will be made to s 45 of the Securities and Futures Commission Ordinance. Ibid, p 2.
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The appointment and role of provisional liquidators in windings up commenced
by regulatory authorities and government officials against companies engaged
in illegal or fraudulent activities
Pursuant to s 193 of the Companies Ordinance, in a winding up by the court,
after the presentation of a winding-up petition, but before the making of a
winding-up order, the court may appoint a provisional liquidator. Upon the
making of a winding-up order, the Official Receiver becomes the provisional
liquidator unless a person other than the Official Receive has been appointed
as provisional liquidator under s 193.83 The provisional liquidator continues to
serve until he or another person is appointed liquidator.84 Until recently, the
practice in liquidations was for private liquidators to be appointed in complicated
cases and for the Official Receiver to serve in less-complicated liquidations.
However, in May 1996 the Official Receiver introduced a scheme to contract
out non-summary court winding-up cases (cases in which the net realisable
assets exceed HK$200,000) and set up an Administrative Panel of Insolvency
Practitioners for Court Winding-Up that included firms of accountants (now
called the Panel A Scheme). Thus, at present, the practice is for the Official
Receiver to serve initially as provisional liquidator. In cases in which there are
sufficient assets to justify an appointment from the Panel A Scheme, the
Official Receiver will then put forward to the creditors a recommendation of
a panel member, in order of rotation, for confirmation as liquidator. The choice
is usually accepted, but the creditors may choose another panel member, or
even an accountant not on the panel, subject to the discretion of the court.
In general, a provisional liquidator may be appointed prior to the making
of a winding-up order where there is evidence that the company's assets are at
risk and may disappear if no action is taken to protect them prior to the hearing
of the winding-up petition. 5 There is no provision in the Companies Ordinance
that sets out the powers of a provisional liquidator, unlike s 199 of the
Ordinance, which sets out the powers of a liquidator.86 Rather, the standard
practice has been for the court to set out the powers of a provisional liquidator
in the order of appointment and for the provisional liquidator to apply to court
if he needs additional powers.8" To address this inadequacy, the Law Reform
Commission has recommended that a schedule be included in the Companies
Ordinance that sets out the powers to be exercised by a provisional
liquidator.88
83 Companies Ordinance, s 194(a), (aa).
'4 Ibid.
85 See Tomasic & Tyler (note 10 above), para [9754], p 3,201; para [9776], p 3,202.
'6 Report on the Wirding.Up Provisions of the Companies Ordinance (note 69 above), para 12.8, p 57.
" Ibid.
88 Ibid, paras 12.3-.11, pp 56.59.
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Given the unusual nature of a petition filed by a regulatory authority or a
government official on public interest, unfair prejudice, or other statutory
grounds against a company (whether solvent or insolvent) allegedly committing
fraud, additional factors are relevant to the appointment of a provisional
liquidator. In the litigation arising out of the appointment of provisional
liquidators for Mandarin Resources - a case commenced on public interest
and unfair prejudice grounds - the Court of Appeal noted that the matter of
appointing a provisional liquidator is a matter of discretion that 'ultimately,
depend[s] on the view [the judge] forms as to whether, on the material before
him, the balance of justice and convenience' supports the appointment. 9
Among the propositions noted by the court in reaching its decision were the
following:
(1) The power of the court to appoint a provisional liquidator, where there
is a 'good prima facie case for a winding up order' is 'quite general';
whether or not such an appointment should be made depends on 'the
circumstances of each particular case' and 'the public interest' may be
a relevant circumstance."
(2) The exercise of the power 'may have serious consequences for the
company, and so a need for the exercise of the power must overtop
those consequences'; but in the case of a public interest petition, 'the
public interest must be given full weight'.91
(3) When, in a 'public interest' petition, it is proved or accepted that a
fairly arguable case for a winding up order has been shown, and the
court is called on to appoint a provisional liquidator, the court, if
satisfied that some relief is called for in order to ensure that the status
quo does not change for the worse before the hearing of the petition,
should appoint a provisional liquidator, unless it is also satisfied that
that would be a disproportionate remedy, and that the desired result
could be achieved by the acceptance of appropriate undertakings or
the imposition of appropriate injunctions.92
In a typical insolvency, a provisional liquidator usually serves for a period
extending for only a matter of months.93 However, in cases commenced by
89 Mandarin Resources II (note 31 above), p 17lB.90 Ibid, p 171D (citing Re UnionAccident Insurance Co Ltd [1972] 1 All ER 1105, per PlowmanJ 1109h).
91 Ibid, p 171E (citing Re Highfield Commodities Ltd [1984] 3 All ER 884, per Sir Robert Megarry VC at
893b/c).
92 Ibid, p 71F-H (citing Re Senator Hanseaische Verwaltungsgesellschaft mbH & Anor [1996] 2 BCLC 562,
especially Sit Richard Scott VC at 596, and (on appeal), [199614 All ER 933 per Millett LJ at 944b-
c).
9' According to the Official Receiver's Office, over the last year the average time period between the
filing of a winding-up petition and the making of a winding-up order has ranged from six weeks to
two months. From the making of the winding up-order, the appointment of a liquidator often takes
up to an additional three months.
government officials or regulatory authorities against fraudulent companies,
the time period can extend for much longer. At the upper extreme, the
provisional liquidator for Mandarin Resources has already served for almost
31/2 years, and it is unclear whether a winding-up order will ever be made in the
proceedings against this company.94 An appointment for several years may
cause difficulties for a provisional liquidator, for an appointment of this length
runs counter to the intended limited nature of the office.
In a case commenced by a regulatory authority or a government official
against a company allegedly engaging in fraudulent or illegal behaviour, a
primary role of the provisional liquidator will be to investigate whether the
company had, in fact, committed fraud.95 Given both the longer periods of time
for which a provisional liquidator may serve in such cases and the need to
investigate thoroughly whether the company actually committed fraud, it
would be very helpful if the powers exercisable by a provisional liquidator were
set out in a schedule to the Companies Ordinance.
Conclusion
The ability of a government official or a regulatory authority to commence
liquidation proceedings against a company allegedly engaged in illegal or
fraudulent activities through the filing of a petition on public interest, unfair
prejudice or other statutory grounds is an important weapon in the government's
arsenal for regulating the behaviour of companies in Hong Kong. The following
comment, which was made in regard to public interest petitions, is pertinent
to all liquidations commenced by regulatory authorities or government officials
against companies carrying on fraudulent activities:
It would be unrealistic to believe that such applications or even the threat
of them ... will stamp out the evils [involving 'dishonesty or malpractices on
the part of... corporate directors'96] .... They may, however, serve to some
extent as a deterrent. Furthermore, particularly in those cases where the
involvement of members of the general public is great, the individual
victims may stand a better chance of discovering how they were treated and
seeing the perpetrators brought to some kind of justice.97
94 The court in Mandarin Resources IV (note 21 above), p 61, found that:
The findings made on the totality of the evidence would justify an order that it is expedient in
the public interest that Mandarin [Resources] be wound up and that it is just and equitable to do
so. However, the time for such an order has not yet arisen and may never do so.95 Or, perhaps, whether the company had been negligent. For example, when speaking in reference to
the liquidation of members of the CA Pacific Group (including CA Pacific Securities), the then SFC
Chairman, Anthony Neoh, noted that the provisional liquidators would be investigating whether
the company was negligent or had committed fraud. See Wong (note 38 above).
96 Cork Report (note 1 above), para 1742, p 391.
97 Ibid, para 1751, p 393.
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To increase the likelihood of such petitions having a deterrent effect, there
needs to be greater transparency in the legislative framework. At a minimum,
either a schedule or a new provision should be included in the Companies
Ordinance (and into the successor Insolvency Ordinance) that sets out all the
bases in the Securities and Futures Commission Ordinance, the Leveraged
Foreign Exchange Trading Ordinance, the Banking Ordinance, and the
Insurance Companies Ordinance that enable the Financial Secretary and
regulatory authorities to petition for the winding up of companies. The
Companies Ordinance should also cross-reference all provisions in these
ordinances that affect the application of the winding-up provisions in the
Companies Ordinance. Eventually, when a comprehensive Insolvency
Ordinance is enacted, it should incorporate all the provisions relating to
winding up in these four ordinances.
The effectiveness of these petitions is also influenced by the scope of
investigatory powers, both pre- and post-petition. By increasing pre-petition
investigatory powers, as the proposed Composite Securities and Futures Bill
will likely do with respect to the powers of the SFC, the government increases
the likelihood of earlier and more frequent intervention against fraudulent
companies through the filing of winding-up petitions. After the filing of such
petitions, it is the provisional liquidator who plays the central role in further
investigating and uncovering wrongful and fraudulent corporate activities. It
would be best for the powers to be exercised by a provisional liquidator to be set
out in the Companies Ordinance. The enactment of these proposed changes
would further protect the interests of the general public.
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